The purpose of this article is to celebrate Bob Simpson's scholarship in the field of labour/employment law by pursuing his special interest in collective labour law into an aspect of labour/employment law which is usually regarded as an individual one, namely that of its personal or 
Introduction
We are both very pleased to have been given the opportunity to contribute to this symposium. 1 The hallmark of Bob Simpson's scholarship in the labour law field has been its high awareness of and sensitivity to the collective dimension of employment relations, even when he is writing about areas of regulation normally regarded as aspects of 'individual' employment law, such as the Minimum Wage legislation. So we welcomed the obligation to follow suit and concentrate on that collective dimension; we have found it interesting and, we hope, productive to try to do this by shifting the focus of our recurring gaze upon 'personal scope' 2 from the individual aspects to the collective aspects of labour law.
The effect of shifting one's focus in that way is immediately to realise to what an extent individual employment law has constituted not merely the prime location but actually the engine-room and driver of the 'personal scope of labour law' discussion, to the effective exclusion of collective labour law. We have a very well-rehearsed and well-developed analytical and normative debate about the personal work relations which are and should be within the scope of particular aspects of labour law's regulation; but that debate unthinkingly settles upon areas such as unfair dismissal law and employment equality law, regarding them, in a way which is itself very questionable, as the embodiments of 'individual employment law' rather than collective labour law. Our analytical and normative perceptions of the personal scope discussion have become very largely confined in that way, so that we found when we embarked on this topic that we had not really thought through the analytical or normative issues of personal scope on the collective side. In the perception that we might not be alone in having suffered from this tunnel vision, we seek to make a few observations on the collective aspects of the personal scope of labour/employment law which we hope may be slightly unfamiliar ones.
Thus when we started concentrating on the collective aspects of personal scope, we found ourselves coming up with one or two interesting curiosities. For example, in some aspects at least of UK collective labour law a significantly different definition of the 'worker' is used from that which is used in individual employment law. The definition of the 'worker' in section 296 of the Trade Union and Labour Relations (Consolidation) Act ('TULRCA') is wider than the Employment Rights Act ('ERA') definition in that it equally begins by extending to all contracts for personal work, and equally contains the 'profession to client' exception but does not contain the further 'business to customer' exception which the ERA definition -the familiar one -does. Then again, if we turn to EU collective labour law, we find that whereas EU individual employment law has tended, latterly at least, to distinguish reasonably carefully between the 'worker' concept and the 'employee' concept (admittedly treating them as somewhat convergent, but nevertheless recognising that they are not one and the same), 'EU collective labour law' (to the debatable extent that such a concepts exists) seems, on occasion at least, to treat the two notions as completely synonymous and interchangeable, for example in Article 9 of the Recast European Works Councils Directive which speaks of 'cooperation between the central management and employees' representatives in the framework of an information and consultation procedure for workers'.
We could go further down this trail of excavation for examples of difference between collective and individual labour law in the matter of personal scope; but it seemed to us more profitable to try to suggest the normative framework within which these developments might be taking place. That normative framework might be interestingly different from the one upon which we explicitly or implicitly rely when we debate the personal scope of individual employment law, if only in the sense that in the case of collective labour law, two competing or opposing possible normative positions seem to present themselves even more strongly and clearly than in the case of individual employment law. One of those possible normative positions points towards a tight confinement of the personal scope of collective labour law to dependent employees, the other towards a radically more inclusive approach. It is in that contestation that we can see one of the locations in which the issue of the 'autonomy of labour law' is most crucially at stake. 
The interpretative approach of the courts in UK law
It must be said that those hoping to find that any such inclusive purposive approach has been taken by the courts of the United Kingdom are in for a disappointment. There are a couple of older decisions which are apt to be regarded as manifesting an exclusive approach to personal scope in the context of collective labour law, but which turn out on re-examination to be equivocal or neutral in that regard. However, there is a more recent leading case which, to an extent that has not been sufficiently remarked, turns out perfectly to represent the narrow approach, albeit in an almost unconscious way.
Thus, the case of Boulting v Association of Cinematograph, Television
and Allied Technicians 6 is apt to be remembered for Lord Denning's denunciation of the proposition that the Boulting brothers as the two joint managing directors of a film production company could be regarded as 'employees' within the meaning of the membership rule of the defendant trade union. However, it is equally to be recalled that this was rather a special case because it concerned the legality of a trade union closed shop which the union sought to enforce upon the senior managers of the workgroup in question. It was decided at a time when closed shop practices had not been generally proscribed but were regarded as very controversial; and moreover it is specially to be noted that the appeal was The negative tradition which was thus instituted seems to have persisted in the jusrisprudence of the United Kingdom throughout the intervening thirty years. In the next section of this paper, our attention turns to the question of whether any different dynamic is to be found in EU law.
3. Labour law and the regulation of competitive markets -the emergence of a new binary divide in EU employment law 9 Ackner LJ giving the leading judgment and introducing the history of the appeal says at p 738 that '[the appellants] complained that the company unfairly dismissed them from their employment at the Grosvenor House Hotel, and that their dismissal was to be regarded as unfair by virtue of section 58 of the Act of 1978, that is to say, they were dismissed for an inadmissible reason, the alleged reason for the dismissal being that they were members of a trade union and had taken part in its activities'.
Probably the best starting point for our inquiry into how, within the framework of EU employment law, the 'binary divide' between employment and self-employment intersects with the normative dilemma outlined in the opening section of this paper is to be found in the analysis of three leading decisions of the ECJ or CJEU, the Albany judgment 10 ,
the Pavlov judgment 11 , and the more recent decision in FNV Kunsten 12 .
We venture to suggest that, prima facie, Albany and Pavlov provide the two antithetical approaches that the CJEU reserves to the exercise of collective rights by employees and the self-employed, respectively, with consistently maintained this interpretation, on the grounds that employed and non-employed workers are normally exposed to the same risks in this area '. 42 This is a fertile line of reasoning that ought to be deployed to 41 Ibid. other risks inherent to all work relations and to various other areas of employment protection legislation that seek to eliminate or redistribute such risks in a more equitable way.
Collective bargaining rights and the Labour v Capital divide in 21
st century personal work relations.
In the previous section it was argued that collective bargaining rights ought to be extended across the binary divide and so that they would be enjoyed by employed and self-employed workers alike. This suggestion was developed on the basis of a critique of the rather crude and, in our In other, jointly written work, we have argued that labour rights ought to be guaranteed across a broader spectrum of 'personal work relations'. 44 In an attempt to redraw the scope of application of labour law in a more principled and just way, we sought to trace its limits by reference to the idea of personality. In this context we noted that our concept of personality (and of personal work relations broadly) 'goes to the exclusion of those service providers who are not operating mainly and predominantly on the basis of their personal work, but rather primarily through their ability to organize other factors of production (and often the factors of production of others), labour and capital in particular. The ability to do so, we believe, makes the person akin to an employer or a commercial entrepreneur, or both, even where some degree of personal work may be present in the actual activity performed'. 45 We remain of the view, expressed already in 2011, that labour law should remain committed to protecting workers whose 'personal work overwhelmingly shapes the service provided, over and above the amount of capital that he or she may be availing herself of to assist him or her, which ought to be marginal and ancillary'. 46 But we feel we ought to clarify the extent to which, in modern day work arrangements, capital can often remain marginal or ancillary to the provision of labour even when it is of essence to the personal work or service provided. We endeavour to do so by reference to the case of the many workers making a living in the 52 Typically, the 'ownership of the assets' is a key factor that will frustrate the successful deployment of a number of key 'employment status' tests and indicators, for instance the business integration test often in conjunction with the economic reality test, and often result in an assumption that a the driver-owner is subject to little or no control on the part of the putative employer. 53 It is our view that it is possible and useful to offer a different perspective on this type of, seemingly capital intensive, personal work relations by reference to two important points. The first point is that an analysis of the nature of a work or other economic relation in abstracto and when the parties of the relationship are not engaging in the actual activity being assessed is, to say the least, an artificial and unproductive exercise. So for instance, it is artificial and unproductive to pass judgment on the status of a 'driver owner' unless that driver is actually performing the service on behalf or for a particular party and in furtherance to a particular arrangement. In abstracto, the owner of a taxi, or goods vehicle, or other similar substantial asset is almost by definition bound to be perceived as a small entrepreneur, or an undertaking, and not a personal work or service provider, relying on considerable assets, or on assets of considerable value. But when the various parties to an arrangement actually engage through that complex set of contractual and non-contractual nexuses and relations that underpin the functioning of the Uber model, in other words 'when the App is switched on, the legal analysis is, we think, different'.
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When the App is switched on -and this is our second point -when the owner-driver is actually performing her or his service then, in our view, the personal nature of the work relationship comes through very neatly indeed. Each particular ride, each particular 'driving service' or series of services, is manifestly predominantly characterised by the provision of personal work rather than by the availability of capital assets and their being supplied to third parties. Capital assets are of course not irrelevant, but they are ancillary to the provision of the service and, overall, quite marginal, even considering additional capital costs such as fuel, asset depreciation, insurance, and servicing. At the end of the working day, the driver will have received payments that, if broken down, overwhelmingly derive from the units of personal work and labour provided rather than from the fraction of capital deployed or consumed for and in the course of the performance of the service in that particular day. The driver's 54 Aslam v Uber, para 86.
contribution to the service reveals itself as being, mainly, one of personal work, rather than capital. The driver is thus performing his work or services under a personal work relation, and not as a business undertaking.
Conclusions
The present article has largely concentrated on the extent to which selfemployed workers may be entitled to 'collective labour rights', and in particular to the right to bargain collectively. We began our enquiry by arguing for a more inclusive normative understanding of collective labour law as essentially part of or continuous with the embodiment of fundamental claims to freedom of association and democratic representation claims in the general political constitution.
There is a generalised understanding, with regard to collective labour law in the UK that the 'worker' definition contained in TULRCA s. 296 does sustain quite an inclusive concept of the worker which embraces a broad range of individuals, including self-employed workers, who contract to provide personal services, except for those who do so as a professional to a client. Unlike the 'worker' definition in the individual rights context of the National Minimum Wage Act, it does not go on to exclude those who provide their services as a business to a customer. We noted that this slightly broader scope is sustained by a careful reading of a number of international instruments, including Recommendation R-198 and Conventions C-87 and C-98; but this approach is clearly rejected by EU competition law, which tends to regard non-subordinate workers engaging in collective relations as undertakings potentially acting in restraint of trade, without regard to the question of whether they may be acting as professionals or businesses. By contrast, the ILO supervisory bodies seem to us to suggest that self-employed workers ought to be entitled to collective bargaining rights, without regard to whether they are acting as professionals to clients or businesses to customers. We submit that this more expansive approach accords better with the inclusive normative framework for which we have argued. This approach is clearly hard to reconcile with the more restrictive approaches which we have encountered, in the course of this article in various area of UK domestic 55 and European law.
Our more inclusive normative framework has its roots in our earlier work which has been developed around the concept of personal work relations and their legal regulation. From that starting point, section 5 explored the extent to which it may be justifiable to leave outside the scope of application of collective labour law such personal work relations as are accompanied by a seemingly substantive asset and capital contribution, as is often the case in many of the work relations prevailing in the so-called collaborative economy. We concluded that for most of these relations, the 'slices' of capital necessary for the actual provision of each service are such as to appear marginal and ancillary to the element of personal work that overwhelmingly shapes the provision itself.
Other articles in this symposium have in various ways pursued Bob
Simpson's special interest in collective labour law. This one has sought to follow that pre-occupation into an aspect of labour/employment law which is all too readily perceived as a purely individual one, namely the question of its 'personal' or relational scope. This represents a leap into rather unfamiliar territory, in which the explorer might easily feel rather lonely and misunderstood. Arguments for an approach to personal scope which is specially inclusive by reference to collective labour rights are apt to seem out of place or even counter-intuitive in a jurisprudence of personal scope which has primarily been developed outside the zone of collective labour law and moreover with a considerable insouciance with regard to collective labour law. It is unlikely that our arguments will have succeeded in countering that insouciance, but we hope that they may have placed the questions of freedom of association, freedom to take industrial action, and rights to collective bargaining, very firmly on the table of the personal scope discussion. This would seem to be a minimal and we hope compelling normative claim in a period when labour/employment law faces an intense struggle to adapt itself to the great turn towards 'flexible', precarious, and often deceptively autonomous patterns of personal work contract or personal work relation.
